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The EU, Turkey, and the "eureferendum"
Why the membership talks with Turkey will have to end with some form of popular say, and where to find a suitable model.
by Bruno Giussani
21 December 2004
The decision by the European Union's leadership to begin membership talks with Turkey is only ten days old, yet it is already becoming apparent to whoever is listening that the long negotiation process will have to be sealed by some form of popular referendum.
Even the most zealous supporter would agree that this is not just another membership talk. Turkey brings up the very question of the nature of the European Union in more ways than the often-used Christian-vs-Muslim shortcut. It crucially asks whether the EU is a geographic and historical entity (in which case, there remain only a few countries to integrate and the task will be completed) or rather a cultural and political idea (one that can be extended and opened potentially ad infinitum to any country that agrees on a specific set of values - and that's revolutionary).
Polls presently show a growing popular discomfort with, and in many countries clear opposing majorities to the idea of Turkey's membership. The leaders of France and Austria have already voiced plans for national referendums. Other countries are considering similar steps.
The Austrians expanded their thinking to suggest that a "sensible approach" (President Heinz Fischer's words) would be to hold a Union-wide referendum. Foreign Minister Ben Bot of the Netherlands, which holds the rotating presidency of the EU, has hurriedly dismissed the idea. There are at least five reasons why the "eureferendum" should instead be seriously considered - and the sooner, the better.
Capping them with the promise of a referendum would give the complex negotiations the uncontaminated room they need. Not doing so would keep them under the shadow of populist alternative designs such as the "associate status" voiced by France's Nicolas Sarkozy and others, which could gain strength if the talks hit a rough spot. It would also leave them hostage to changes in the international landscape or to shifts in a member state's domestic political distribution.
Secondly, introducing the idea of a "final say by the citizens" would peel off at least one of the many layers of mistrust that a large portion of Europeans entertain towards Brussels' technocrats and which the Turkish issue is likely to further excite.
Thirdly: nobody can afford, without enormous and lasting damages, that such a long and complex negotiation be buried at the end by the veto of just one or two countries which may decide (possibly for opportunistic domestic reasons) to held national referendums. Such an occurrence would be totally uncomprehensible in Turkey. It would also put at risk the stability of the EU itself and wreak its credibility outwards.
Furthermore, an EU-wide referendum would confer to the decision (both in case of a "yes" and a "no") an unquestionable political legitimacy.
Finally, and conversely, the prospect of a popular referendum in ten or twelve years would act as a catalyst in forcing the EU leadership to clarify consistently and convincingly the vision and the reasons underscoring Turkey's membership (and the way beyond it for the EU).
Hence the noteworthiness of the Austrian suggestion.
There is a model for such a referendum. It is to be found in the very geographical heart of the Union: Switzerland's double-majority referendum. Under this model, both a majority of the people (within a single, EU-wide voting zone) and a majority of the member states (in the current EU configuration: 13) would be concurrently needed for the proposal to be accepted. The former condition gives significant leverage to the largest countries; the latter compensates by amplifying the voice of the smaller members.
There are also good reasons why the "eureferendum" should not be an ad-hoc device brought forth only for dealing with the Turkish issue. Rather, prompted and rendered necessary by it, it could become a constitutional right of the European Union. One that would give its citizens an increased sense of membership in the major decisions that will shape their common becoming, foster a tangible sense of shared identity and destiny (note to Communications Commissioner Margot Wallstrom: there is something for you to work with here), and significantly contribute to lessen the Union's "democratic deficit".
(copyright 2004 Bruno Giussani)
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